QUOTE OF THE WEEK

"I am the only person-like thing (person, actually) that is needed in a description of my bodily activity" (McDowell (2007) "Response to Dreyfus" in Inquiry 50.4: 369)

Sunday, January 25, 2009

the upsurge of spontaneity

a paper to be presented at the central APA on the Dreyfus-McDowell debate:

Andreas Elpidorou (Boston University): “The Upsurge of Spontaneity: The Role and Place of Merleau-Ponty in the Dreyfus-McDowell Debate.” Paper 2 in Session II-F, ‘Continental Philosophy’ (Friday 9:00 a.m.)

Elpidorou's abstract from the proceedings:

In a multifaceted debate between Dreyfus and McDowell, Merleau-Ponty has been unambiguously placed on the side of the former. In line with Dreyfus, Merleau-Ponty holds that conceptual activity is founded upon a pre-thematic and unreflective engagement with the world. Spontaneity, they both agree, is the result of the transformation of the non-conceptual to the conceptual. In what follows, I argue that Dreyfus's account of this transformation is only partially in agreement with the one advanced by Merleau-Ponty. More explicitly, I demonstrate that whereas Dreyfus holds that the difference between the nonconceptual and the conceptual is a difference in kind, Merleau-Ponty puts forth a more nuanced explanation of the relationship between the two: Namely, by arguing that the two differ both in degree and in kind, Merleau-Ponty does away with the exclusive dualism that Dreyfus inherits by maintaining a difference in kind, which is a radical or categorical difference.

1 comments:

Duck said...

I haven't read Merleau-Ponty that much, but I always suspected that something like this was the case. After all, "founded on" could mean anything - it doesn't mean that if A is "founded on" B, then the difference between A and B must be dualistically construed.

Thanks for the tip!